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I Introduction 
 
Liability for unknown risks is a difficult topic, not only for legal scholars but also in Law 
and Economics.1 The reason is, in essence, simple: a lack of information about the risks 
involved. The Law and Economics of tort law centers on the incentives that tort law can 
provide to the various actors in order to take better decisions regarding their level of care and 
level of activity, and in order to reach a desirable risk distribution. However, how does 
liability for risks which are not known at the time of acting affect the behavior of the parties 
involved? Can liability for such unknown risks give better incentives for optimal behavior, 
or will it by definition lead to excessive care and a too low activity level? These and 
comparable questions will be discussed in this contribution. 
 
When analyzing liability for unknown risks from an economic perspective, it will 
become apparent that in a sense we are approaching the boundaries of what tort law can 
accomplish. This opens a subsequent important question: should unknown risks be dealt 
with via tort law in the first place, or is public regulation better suited to deal with this 
challenge? The Law and Economics literature, more specifically literature on the topic of 
optimal enforcement, compares and contrasts tort law and regulation as two ways to 
deal with the problem of ‘negative externalities’. These are costs which are not borne by 
the persons who have caused them, but by others. The archetypical example is 
environmental pollution: if during the production process eg the air is polluted, it is the 
people who breathe that air who bear these costs, not the producers or consumers. The 
product price hence does not capture all the costs the production imposes on society, so that 
it is too cheap, and too much will be produced and consumed. Various legal instruments can 
result in internalization of the externality, such as taxes (eg per tonne of emission), 
criminal law (financial penalties for environmental crimes), but also regulation (which eg 
requires certain filters to be installed) and tort liability (where the victims can claim tort 
damages from the polluter). Regarding the topic of unknown risks, it is an important 
question whether tort law or regulation can better steer the behaviour of the parties 
involved in the desirable direction. Issues such as the available information (for regulation 
the information of the legislator, for tort liability the information of plaintiffs, 
defendants and courts), issues of enforcement (public versus private), administrative costs 
and the influence of interest groups are relevant here. 
 
In this contribution we will provide a short introduction into the economic analysis of tort 
liability and regulation (Section II) as two distinct ways of dealing with the market failure of 
negative externalities. In Section III we will discuss tort liability for unknown risks in more 
detail and we will analyze the way in which such liability may impact the incentives 
                                                          
1 In this article we use the term ‘unknown risks’ as a synonym of ‘unknown dangers’. The term ‘risk’ hence 
does not intend to express that there is statistical information available about the probability distribution of the 
various possible outcomes. ‘Risk’ in this latter sense in the literature is confronted with the term ‘uncertainty’, 
where the probability distribution of the outcomes is not known. In fact, the case of ‘unknown risks’ will often 
be a situation of uncertainty rather than of risk. We chose to use the term ‘unknown risks’ nonetheless, because 
this is the topic of the Special Session of the 15th Annual Conference on European Tort and Insurance Law. See 
eg FH Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921). 
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provided by tort law. This section will show that there are several effects that can be 
distinguished, and that tradeoffs between these effects are unavoidable. It turns out not to be 
possible to give a definite answer whether liability for unknown risks is desirable and if so 
to what extent; it depends on the situation. What is possible in our view is to make 
generalizing remarks on this trade-off, which enables to distinguish between types of cases. 
The difficulties of tort law in dealing with unknown risks are reasons to investigate whether 
public regulation might be a preferable approach and if yes, under which conditions. We will 
do this in Section IV. In that section we will more particularly pay attention to the question 
whether either the regulator or the judge is better placed to deal with unknown risks. 
Unknown risks may also pose serious problems for insurers as knowledge concerning 
risks is usually considered a primary condition for insurability. Hence, we will also 
address to what extent liability for unknown risks may cause insurability problems (Section 
V). In Section VI we will conclude. 
 
 
II Liability and Regulation from an Economic Point of View – A Summary 
 
As a starting point and as a theoretical foundation for the analysis of liability for unknown 
risks we will first explain the basic economics of torts and of optimal law enforcement, 
whereby also the main differences between tort and regulation will be highlighted. At a later 
stage this will be applied to the specific case of unknown risks.  
 
 
A Basic Economic Function of Tort Law 
 
Liability and regulation become relevant from a Law and Economics’ point of view once a 
market failure is established. The primary market failure experienced in tort law consists of 
a negative externality. The basic idea is that by exposing tortfeasors to the social costs of 
their activity, they will have ex ante incentives to take optimal preventive measures. This 
perspective reasons from the angle of the deterrence function of tort law that induces 
compliant behaviour by potential tortfeasors in the sense that they take optimal care, which 
is the primary function for an economic analysis.2 Optimal care is defined as the level of 
care where the marginal costs of taking more care equal the marginal benefits thereof (in 
the sense of a reduction in the expected accident losses). In addition to taking optimal care 
the parties involved in an accident setting should also be provided incentives to choose an 
optimal activity level.3  
The second crucial function of tort law is that of victim compensation.4 In the deterrence 
framework, expected liability matters to the potential tortfeasor ex ante.5 (Potential) 
tortfeasors are regarded as rational utility maximisers, and therefore weigh possible benefits 
against the costs of their behaviour. Like anyone else, they respond to incentives. The effect 
of deterrence in the tort law setting translates into (potential) tortfeasors taking optimal care 
and carrying out the activity at the optimal level.  
 
 
B Strict Liability versus Negligence 
                                                          
2 See R Cooter/T Ulen, Law & economics, (5th edn 2008) 336-338. 
3 See S Shavell, Foundations of economic analysis of law (2004), 193-199. 
4 For the goals of tort law, for instance, see D Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions 
in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss (2002) 88 Virginia Law Review 1871.  
5 Shavell (fn 3) 515. 
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From an economic perspective, the main goal of tort law is to provide behavioural 
incentives to the actors involved. Within tort law, more specifically one distinguishes 
negligence-based and strict liability regimes6 and between  unilateral (where only the 
tortfeasor affects the accident probability)and bilateral cases (where also the victim impacts 
the accident probability).7  
 
In the unilateral scenario, both strict liability and negligence induce the tortfeasor to take 
optimal care, provided that the court sets the level of due care at the socially optimal level. 
Regarding the activity level, under negligence an injurer would escape liability if he took due 
care, no matter how often he carried out an activity and will consequently choose a too high 
activity level. In case of strict liability the tortfeasor chooses the optimal activity level, 
because he bears both the benefits and the costs of this activity. Turning to the bilateral 
scenario, pure strict liability leads to no care and an excessive activity level for the victim, 
because he does not bear any costs. The injurer will choose excessive care and a suboptimal 
activity level (assuming care and activity inputs of both players are substitutes). A defense of 
contributory negligence can provide correct care incentives to the victim.8 Alternatively, a 
negligence rule provides good care incentives to both parties, if the court sets due care at the 
optimal level. However, only the party that ultimately bears the accident losses will choose the 
correct activity level. 
 
 
C Liability versus Regulation 
 
With a view to the interplay between liability and regulation, in his seminal paper Shavell 
determines how risky activities should be controlled on the basis of four key parameters.9  
First, an information advantage of the public authority over private parties or vice versa. This 
would make one of the options more attractive. The second aspect concerns whether there is 
an insolvency risk with the defendants. If they were facing a private liability suit that was 
beyond their assets, they could not be deterred fully. On the other hand, in the regulatory 
context, they would have needed to comply with certain standards in order to be allowed to 
carry out the activity in the first place. A third aspect concerns the question whether the 
responsible parties would face a suit for the harm done in court at all. Reasons for why this 
may not be the case in Shavell’s words are dispersed harm, a long lapse of time before harm 
eventuates and difficulties in attributing the harm to the responsible party. More commonly 
these days one focuses on the rational victim’s cost benefit analysis. She will not act if costs 
outweigh the benefits, for instance when harm is very small and the investment to enforce the 
law is costly.10 This is the so-called ‘rational apathy’. Total harm to society may be large, but 
if it is widespread it may be small per victim. No enforcement action may then be taken 
                                                          
6 See eg H-B Schäfer/F Müller-Langer, Strict liability versus negligence, in: M Faure (ed), Tort law and 
Economics, Vol. 1 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (2nd edn 2009). 
7 Shavell (fn 3) 177-206. 
8 See LT Visscher, Tort Damages, in: M Faure (ed), Tort Law and Economics, Vol. 1, Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics (2nd edn. 2009), 156–158 and 173-174 f. 
9 See S Shavell, Liability for harm versus regulation of safety (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies (JLS) 357. 
Also see CD Kolstad/TS Ulen/GV Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs Ex Ante Safety Regulation: 
Substitutes or Complements? (1990) 80 American Economic Review 888. 
10 See RJ Van den Bergh, Should Consumer Protection Laws Be Publicly Enforced?,in: W van Boom/M Loos 
(eds.), Collective enforcement of consumer law: securing compliance in Europe through private group action 
and public authority intervention (2007), 184. 
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because of a divergence between the individual and social incentive to sue.11 This harms 
society and reduces incentives to comply. Lastly, as has been stressed by Shavell, one of the 
strengths of the private liability system is that it only incurs costs whenever a case is brought. 
Regulation will always lead to costs. Safety regulation (enforced through administrative law) 
would work to a large extent ex ante and would not be triggered by harm and could therefore 
potentially lead to high costs.12 This assessment varies with the type of cases at hand. The ex 
ante dimension may not always be more important than the ex post dimension if, for instance, 
a lot of compliance checks have to be carried out. The main costs with public enforcement 
occur in the form of monitoring and investigation, particularly, the use of investigative 
powers.13  
 
With a view to remedies, civil liability typically results in compensation payments. In stark 
contrast to civil litigation the benefits for individuals involved in an administrative 
procedure usually do not include compensation.14 The possibility of obtaining compensation 
is typically an important motivation for claimants.15 Public agencies traditionally have 
remedies like injunctions, revocation of licenses or fines at their disposition. If the authority 
works on the basis of giving out permits, by checking that companies fulfill the necessary 
requirements, harm may not occur in the first place. 
 
 
III Liability for Unknown Risks 
 
A Introduction 
 
The economic approach to law assumes that the actors can assess the costs and benefits of 
care, because their care and activity decisions depend on how they weigh these costs and 
benefits. In case of unknown risks, this weighing process might not result in optimal 
decisions, because some of the costs that are relevant for a correct weighing, are not (yet) 
known. The important question of course is: do we want injurers to be held liable for 
unknown risks? In order to answer this question from an economic perspective, we have to 
compare the behavioural incentives in case of possible liability for unknown risks with 
those where liability for such risks is not possible. Several aspects are relevant here, which 
are discussed below. We will discuss both situations where a risk is unknown according to 
the state of the art (so the scientific and technical knowledge) and situations where a risk 
was known according to the state of the art but not to the individual injurer. The question 
in the latter case is whether an injurer should be able to escape liability for risks which 
were known in science, but which were not known to him. In this respect, issues such as 
information costs and benefits are relevant and one can indeed imagine that there are 
situations in which the costs for an injurer to become informed about certain risks (which 
are known according to the state of the art) outweigh the benefits (of being able to adapt 
the behavior to this new information and thereby avoiding liability claims). We will return to 
both issues in our detailed discussion. 
                                                          
11 See WM Landes/RA Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law (1975) 4 JLS 1, 33. 
12 See Shavell (1984) 13 JLS 357. 
13 See D Wittman, Prior regulation versus post liability: The choice between input and output monitoring (1977) 
6 JLS 193, 207. 
14 However, in some cases the individual can use the outcome of the administrative law enforcement in a 
subsequent private law suit.  
15 See S Shavell, The optimal structure of law enforcement (1993) 36 JLE 255, 267: other incentives for an 
individual are the desire to avoid future harm, the retributive motive, and possibly a fear of reprisal. 
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B Effects of missing information 
 
1) Care level 
 
If a certain risk is not known according to the state of the art at the time a potential injurer 
acts, will liability for such risks affect the care level taken by the injurer? Schäfer and Ott 
argue that this will not be the case, because one cannot base care decisions on things one 
does not know. Because the risks were not know according to the state of the art, even with a 
higher level of care the risks would still be unknown. Lowering the probability of such 
unknown risks cannot be achieved with taking more care, because one does not know the risks 
in the first place.16 Calabresi and Klevorick however argue that liability for unknown risks can 
affect the care level.17 In their comparison of, roughly speaking, negligence where only 
information at the time of acting is used and negligence where information at the time of the 
trial is used, they state that the uncertainty inherent in the latter case can result in both 
excessive care and inadequate care.18 In that sense, different than Schäfer and Ott, they speak 
of two different types of negligence standards. Taking more care may reduce the chance of 
being found negligent, which could give an incentive to take socially excessive care. After all, 
the private benefits of taking more care (possibly escaping liability altogether) outweigh the 
social benefits (lowering the expected accident losses).19 On the other hand, as Calfee and 
Craswell argue, the new information might also show that the behavior was less risky than 
thought ex ante, which might induce potential tortfeasors to take less care. This last issue, 
however, is not relevant for the topic of liability for unknown risks. 
 
 
2) Activity level 
 
Ott and Schäfer argue, comparably to their line of reasoning regarding the care level, 
that unknown risks cannot provide relevant information for improving one's activity level. 
After all, one does not know whether such risks exist and, therefore, one does not know how 
much expected accident losses they might entail. Hence, one cannot base optimal activity 
decisions on them. However, fear for liability for unknown risks might induce actors to 
withdraw from the activity altogether. In as far as the activity was socially desirable, this 
would cause inefficiencies.20 An important element to take into consideration in the analysis 
is that many activities that could create unknown risks, such as for example genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), particular pharmaceuticals or instruments in the fight against 
climate change (like carbon capture and storage) do not only create risks, but they may have 
beneficial aspects for society as well. Those beneficial aspects are referred to as positive 
externalities. The goal of tort law is to not only deter the potential harm resulting from 
                                                          
16 H-B Schäfer/C Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts (2012) pp. 239. However, they add 
that there are restrictions to this statement: society also has an interest to develop institutions that make it 
worthwhile to invest in research to find out whether seemingly harmless activities could nevertheless still have 
potential for damage. In that case liability would provide incentives to tortfeasors to do the necessary research to 
find out the potential of danger. 
17 G Calabresi/AK Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts (1985) 14 JLS 585, 619. Also see MF Grady, 
Causation and foreseeability, in: J Arlen (ed), Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts (2013), 133. 
18 Also see JE Calfee/R Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance With Legal Standards (1984) 70 
Va.L.Rev. 965, to which Calabresi and Klevorick refer. 
19 Also see O Ben-Shahar, Should Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight? (1998) 14 JLEO, 325 326. 
20 Schäfer/Ott (fn 16) 240. 
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(unknown) risks (negative externalities) but equally to promote and protect those benefits 
(positive externalities) to society as well.21 If tort law would expand to such an extent that 
activity levels would be reduced, there is a danger that the positive externalities would be 
lost to society as well. 
 
 
C Incentive to do research 
Given that the general existence of unknown risks is acknowledged, in a next step one 
should ask if incentives can be tuned in a way to find out more about these risks.22 The 
question arises whether an actor, if she would be shielded from liability because she was 
exercising due care in the light of the available knowledge to her, would still have incentives 
to investigate further to obtain more information concerning potential risks. It may be 
obvious that, especially under the application of the negligence rule, as we will argue below, 
this incentive to do this further research might be diluted if the applicable standard of care 
would only be based on the available knowledge at the time of acting.  
 
Liability for unknown risks can induce the potential injurer to do more research, in order 
to find out if there are more risks than are currently known.23 Liability for unknown risks can 
hence push the state of the art forward, provided that the potential tortfeasor is indeed able to 
do such research (or hire others to do so).24 Finsinger and Simon write in this respect, 
when analyzing the development risk defense from the field of product liability: ‘History 
teaches that it are the firms who first collect hints, and then acquire evidence of such risks. 
(…) Producers first learn about development risks.’25 
‘’Potential tortfeasors also need to be provided with incentives to inform themselves about 
the state of the art. The objective here is not pushing the state of the art forward, but 
ensuring that the state of the art is common knowledge among the operators and can, hence, 
serve as a baseline for the behavioural standards that liability is imposed upon. 
The literature which discusses the possible effect of liability for unknown risks on the 
incentives to obtain information, distinguishes between strict liability and negligence. In 
both cases, the assumption is that without doing additional research, the potential 
tortfeasor bases his care and activity decisions on his current assessment of risk. Shavell 
labels this care level as ‘moderate’ care.26 If the additional research reveals that the 
behavior is more risky than originally thought, the potential tortfeasor can increase his 
care level and reduce his activity level, because those levels turn out to be preferable over 
the previous average care level. If the research reveals that the behavior is less risky than 
originally thought, the opposite holds. 
 
 
1) Strict liability 
 
In deciding whether or not to do additional research, the potential injurer assesses the 
probability that his behaviour is more or less dangerous than currently known. Doing 
                                                          
21 See I Gilead, Tort law and internalization: the gap between private loss and social costs (1997) 17 IRLE 589. 
22 Schäfer/Ott (fn 16), 240. 
23 See especially S Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk (1992) 21 JLS 259. 
24 Schäfer/Ott (fn 16) 240.. 
25 J Finsinger/J Simon, An Economic Assessment of the EC Product Liability Directive and the Product 
Liability Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, in: M Faure/R Van den Bergh (eds), Essays in Law and 
Economics (1989), 196. 
26 Shavell (1992) 21 JLS 259, 260. 
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research yields two expected benefits: 
 
1. A reduction in total accident costs (which consist of the costs of care plus the 
expected accident losses at that level of care) caused by a lower care level if the activity 
turns out to be less dangerous, multiplied by the probability that the activity indeed 
turns out to be less dangerous; 
2. A reduction in the total accident costs caused by a higher care level in case the 
activity turns out to be more dangerous, multiplied by the probability that the activity 
indeed turns out to be more dangerous. 
 
If these expected benefits outweigh the costs of research, the actor will engage in research. 
This is a socially desirable decision, because with strict liability there is no difference 
between private benefits and social benefits: the injurer bears all costs and receives all 
benefits of additional research. Because the private and social benefits of care are the same, 
the actor takes socially desirable decisions. Hence, he only does additional research if this is 
socially desirable.  
 
 
2) Negligence 
 
If negligence means that an injurer can only be liable if he took too little care, given 
optimal collection of information, also negligence can result in socially desirable behavior. 
 
• Let us first assume that the information costs outweigh the sum of benefits (1) and 
(2) mentioned above, so that research is not required and moderate care is socially 
optimal. An injurer who does not obtain more information will indeed take moderate 
care, which is desirable. In this setting, tort law will indeed not induce the injurer to 
obtain additional information. The private benefits of doing research only consist of 
a possible decrease in care costs if the activity turns out to be less dangerous. 
Benefit (2) however does not exist at all because moderate care was already enough to 
escape liability. Hence, the private benefits are lower than the social benefits, and the 
social benefits were already assumed to be lower than the costs of additional research. 
• Let us now assume that that the information costs are smaller than the sum of benefits 
(1) and (2), so that it is socially desirable to do research. An actor who indeed does 
additional research, will adapt his care level to the information he found and 
hence will act socially desirably. Tort law will induce the injurer to always indeed 
obtain this additional information. After all, if he would not do research, he would still 
have to decide on which care level to choose: high care, or a lower care level: 
o In case he would decide to take a lower care level, he would choose moderate 
care, because that is the best he can do if he does not have more information. 
Because we assumed that the social benefits of doing research outweighed the costs 
of research, and because under negligence the private benefits of doing research 
(escaping liability altogether) are larger than the social benefits (‘merely’ reducing 
the total costs of accidents), the injurer is always incentivized to do the research. 
o In case he would chose high care, private benefit (2) would not exist because the 
injurer already takes high care. Private benefit (1) however is now very large, 
because it consists of the difference in care costs between high and low care. It 
can be mathematically proven that this private benefit outweighs the information 
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costs, so that here as well, the injurer decides to obtain additional information.27 
 
If negligence, to the contrary, means that the injurer can only be held liable if he took too 
little care, given the information he possessed, the injurer might not get adequate incentives to 
obtain information. If he acquires more information and finds out that his activity is less 
dangerous than previously thought, he can reduce his care level, which provides a private 
benefit and on a social level also still is desirable (the reduction in care costs outweighs the 
increase in expected accident losses due to this lower level of care). But if he finds out that 
his behaviour is more dangerous than previously thought, he has to increase his care 
level. This is socially desirable (because the decrease in expected accident losses 
outweighs the increase in care costs), but entails a private cost (the higher care costs). 
Hence, the private benefits of information are lower than the social benefits of 
information. This implies that there can be situations where the social benefits of 
information may outweigh the information costs, but the private benefits do not. Potential 
injurers in such settings are not incentivised to do adequate research. 
 
 
3) Conclusion and application to product liability scenario 
 
In order to provide potential injurers with desirable incentives to obtain information, one 
should not look at what the injurer knew, but at what he should have known. This line of 
reasoning is relevant for the evaluation of the state-of-the-art defense, where an injurer in 
essence argues that he did not know the risk and did not have to know it, because it was 
not known according to the state of the scientific and technical knowledge. This is, for 
instance, a prominent discussion with a view to product liability law. Due to a political 
compromise as it stands product liability operates on the European level under a regime of 
strict liability for defective products, however, subject to a ‘development risk defense’. The 
European Union Product Liability Directive explicitly excludes liability with the 
‘development risk defense’ provided for in Article 7(e) of the directive, which protects the 
producer from liability if she can prove that the state of scientific and technical knowledge 
at the time when the product was put into circulation was not such as to enable the existence 
of the defect to be discovered, ie, signaling a preference for the opposite of development 
risks liability.28 Article 15(1)(b) does provide an option for Member States to introduce 
liability for development risks;29 however this option has only been taken up to date by 
Luxembourg and Finland.30 These are hence the only countries which accept liability for 
development risks. One can discuss if the reluctance to apply development risks liability 
may lead to inefficiencies and may reduce the incentives for producers to reduce the risk of 
products where they are able to do so in a cost effective manner.31 Schäfer and Ott are 
against imposing liability for development risks altogether because unknown risks cannot be 
                                                          
27 Shavell (1992) 21 JLS 259, 266. 
28 Id. at art. 7(e); See also J Boyd/DE Ingberman, Should “Relative Safety” be a Test of Product Liability? 
(1997) 26 JLS 433, explaining that the ‘customary practice test’ tends to induce inadequate safety, whereas the 
‘technological advancement test’ tends to induce excessive safety. 
29 See generally Council Directive 85/374, art.15, 1985 O.J. (L 210) (EC) (responsibilities of Member States).  
30 HC Taschner, Harmonization of Product Liability Law in the European Community (1999), 34 Tex.Int.L.J. 
21, 32. It has also been adopted by Spain, for food and medicinal products, and by France for products derived 
from the human body. See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper Liability for Defective 
Products 34-35 (1999). 
31 MG Faure/MEA Goodwin/F Weber, The regulator's dilemma: caught between the need for flexibility & the 
demands of foreseeability. Reassessing the lex certa principle (2014) 24 Albany Law Journal of Science & 
Technology 283, 356. 
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considered in such a calculation exercise.32 However, they acknowledge that incentives to 
do research can only be given via a liability. Either way the case may be different with new 
technologies that are prima facie cases of risky activities. ‘’ 
 
From an economic perspective, such a defense should only be accepted if the costs of 
doing additional research outweigh the expected benefits thereof. As was argued above, 
under negligence such a defense avoids that actors do more research than is desirable, and 
under strict liability the actor already has the correct incentives to only do research if the 
benefits outweigh the costs. 
 
This implies that a state-of-the-art defense should not always be accepted: there can be 
situations in which a risk is not part of the state of the art, but additional research by the 
injurer would have entailed lower costs than benefits. This is especially relevant in situations 
where the injurer might possess specific information and experience. On the other hand, it is 
also conceivable that certain risks are known in science, but that the costs of the injurer of 
becoming informed about these risks outweigh the benefits. In such situations, even though 
the risk was known in science, one still could reach the conclusion that this tortfeasor did 
not have to know this risk, and hence that liability is not warranted to make it profitable for 
him to engage in the activity.  
 
In the above-explained line of reasoning, probabilities played an important role, and here 
one still has to decide whether one only regards the possibilities as they were assessed at 
the time of the act, or at the time of trial. . If one uses ex ante probabilities, a situation might 
occur in terms of which too little research will be done and a too low care level will be 
chosen, as compared to the information at the time of trial. At that later time, it could turn 
out that more research and/or more care would have been desirable.33 On the other hand, if 
one uses ex post probabilities, the actor might be incentivized to do too much research (in 
order to avoid liability in the future) and to take too much care (as was already explained in 
Section 3.2.1 above). Which approach is better depends on which results in a more desirable 
outcome. This cannot be determined in abstract terms. 
 
 
D Innovation 
 
Besides doing more research in order to investigate whether unknown risks exist, 
potential injurers (especially if they are manufacturers) may also try to innovate, in 
the sense of developing new products and techniques. The two perspectives may to some 
extent be interlinked. If firms in this way improve upon existing products and techniques, 
innovation is stimulated with positive effects for social welfare as a result. However, it is 
also possible that liability for unknown risks does not stimulate innovation, but actually 
hinders it. Fear of liability for possible hidden risks in these new products may result in 
                                                          
32 Schäfer/Ott (fn 16) 385; T Cosack Die Gefährdungshaftung im Vordringen - Hintergründe und ... 
Versicherungsrecht (1992), VersR , 1439, 1441. Also see Fondazione Rosselli, Final Report ‘Analysis of the 
Economic Impact of the Development Risk Clause as provided by Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for 
Defective Products’ (2004) 36. 
33 Ben-Shahar (1998) 14 JLEO 325, 346 argues that even when using ex ante knowledge, there might still be an 
incentive to do research, because this research might reveal that the activity is less dangerous than originally 
thought. If the research reveals more risks, the injurer might try to keep that information secret. This last step 
differs from the analysis of Shavell explained above, according to which such information would result in the 
injurer having to take more care. 
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firms not developing such new products. This could hence result in less innovation.34 The 
firms might prefer trying to limit the familiar risks of existing products over developing 
new products which might suffer from unknown risks.35 Landes and Posner argue that 
liability for unknown risks will induce the manufacturer to actively invest in technologies 
that increase the safety of their products, rather than waiting to see if such new 
information will become available over time.36 
 
Huber has argued that under liability for unknown risks, manufacturers will not market a 
product which might suffer from unknown risks.37 This statement reveals another important 
insight. It is desirable if the product indeed suffers from inefficient risks, but it is undesirable 
if the introduction of socially desirable new products or techniques is delayed or frustrated 
altogether.38 One proxy of assessing how many unknown risks might be out there with a 
view to a certain product is the degree to which details about a product are known.  
Even if a new product would actually be safer than the old one, fear of liability for 
unknown risks might result in not marketing this new product but rather accepting 
liability for the known old risks.39 Whether liability for unknown risks is desirable then 
depends on what is more important: avoiding the marketing of products which are not 
(yet) safe enough, or not hindering the introduction of better new products. 
 
 
E Conclusion 
 
It is not possible to give a clear answer to the question whether liability for unknown risks 
is socially desirable, and if so in the form of which regime. If such liability results in more 
care, this could be excessive, but not having liability for unknown risks could result in too 
little care. The same holds for the activity level, although fully stopping the activity will 
often constitute a too low activity level (unless it indeed suffers from unknown risks and 
does not yield much benefits). Liability for unknown risks induces actors to obtain more 
information about risks. If ex post information is used to determine the standard of due 
care, the incentives to do research might be excessive, but when using ex ante information, 
the opposite problem may occur. Innovation is also affected: it may be stimulated in order 
to make the products safer, or it may be hindered because manufacturers are afraid of 
marketing new products with possible unknown risks. In the field of pharmaceutical 
products, possible liability for unknown risks seems to have a limiting effect. Depending 
on the true characteristics of the product, this effect is socially desirable or undesirable. The 
overall effect of liability for unknown risks on administrative costs is unclear: there may 
be more tort claims, but the individual claims are less complicated. 
It is possible to make some generalizing statements nonetheless. In as far as the 
activity involved serves a more important social goal (eg new medicines to combat eg 
cancer), hindering introduction and innovation comes at higher social costs, due to the 
likely delay in introduction. For such situations, liability for unknown risks should be used 
cautiously. One might even conclude that for certain unknown risks, society at large should 
                                                          
34 Schäfer/Ott (fn 16) 386. Also see Fondazione Roselli (fn 32) 51ff. 
35 See eg JW Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing (1983) 58 
NYU L.Rev 734, 755. 
36 WM Landes/RA Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability (1985) 14 JLS 535, 555. 
37 P Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts (1985) 85 
Col.L.Rev., 277, 308. 
38 See eg Wade (1983) 58 NYU L.Rev. 734, 755. 
39 Huber (1985) 85 Col.L.Rev. 277, 308. This issue is especially relevant for the introduction of vaccines, which 
might suffer from unknown side-effects. 
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bear the costs rather than the individual operator. This can be achieved by eg letting the state 
bear the costs of such risks. Cooter and Ulen provide an interesting illustration of this: 
manufacturers of a vaccine against swine flu were only willing to market the vaccines after 
the federal government agreed to be the exclusive defendant in any actions for harms arising 
from the swine flu vaccine.40 One could also think of systems where research ‘fishing’ for 
unknown risks should be carried out by society rather than by operators to avoid large 
societal losses. The calculation would, after all, depend on the magnitude of the societal loss 
due to an unknown risk. 
Another general conclusion is that the easier it is for a potential injurer to acquire 
information, the more knowledge we should expect of him. This implies that ‘what the 
injurer should have known’ might differ per type of injurer. Some of them do not have to be 
familiar with the state of scientific and technical knowledge, while others might even be 
expected to know more than that. 
What also has become clear, is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to use tort law as 
an instrument to provide the socially optimal incentives if unknown risks are involved. This 
opens the question whether alternatives to tort law might be better suited to achieve this 
goal. In Section 4 we will analyse the potential of regulation from this perspective. 
 
 
IV The regulator versus the courts 
 
In section 2 we already discussed the optimal enforcement theory arguing that from 
the perspective of the theory of Shavell, under certain circumstances regulation may be a 
preferred instrument compared to the tort system.41 One of the criteria advanced by Shavell 
was the information available to parties (for regulation the information of the legislator 
and for tort liability the information of plaintiffs, defendants and courts). We will apply 
this general framework to the case of unknown risks and argue that since operators may 
(by definition) lack information on unknown risks there could be a priority for safety 
regulation. This follows from what is often referred to as a public interest theory of safety 
regulation (A). However, a difficulty with this argument is that it supposes that the risks 
are not unknown in absolute terms, but unknown to operators, whereas they could be 
knowable to regulators. That, however, may not always be the case and hence not an 
absolute argument to merely rely on safety regulation. Under the circumstances sketched 
in section 3 there may still be room for liability as a complement to safety regulation (B). 
Moreover, dependent upon the danger of capture with the regulator versus the expertise 
of the courts it may be possible to look for smart mixes, combining regulation and 
liability rules to deal in an optimal way with unknown risks (C). 
 
 
A Priority for safety regulation?  
 
Initially we differentiated between the case where a risk is not known to the operator because 
its existence is not yet part of the state of the art yet and the case where it is not known to the 
operator despite being part of the state of the art. Now, obviously it is challenging to identify 
the information level with a view to different operators. A public regulator is generally 
speaking privileged when it comes to information gathering compared to private individuals. 
When information becomes highly technical or scientific, a public authority might be better 
                                                          
40 Cooter/Ulen (fn 2) 363. 
41 See Shavell (1984) 13 JLS 357. 
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equipped to gather or produce it.42 The advantage of a regulator is that it could make use of 
economies of scale. This implies that research into the consequences of new activities and the 
risks involved would only have to be carried out once by a regulator who could subsequently 
pass on the obtained information via regulation instead of having the situation where each 
separate operator would have to undertake the research separately. This seems to make a case 
for the fact that a public regulator would be in a better position to obtain information about 
the state of the art. . Under strict liability it would be the operator who would need to do the 
research; under negligence it would be the judge who would have to fix the optimal care 
standard. Both operators and judges may be in a less advantageous position compared to the 
regulator to undertake the research aimed at obtaining information, however. 
 
Entrusting a regulator to issue safety regulation, hence, seems to dramatically reduce the 
likelihood that an operator miscalculates his care level because he was not aware of a certain 
risk which according to the state of the art was widely dispersed knowledge as could happen 
with a strict liability regime. At the same time, obviously an error produced at a central level 
obviously affects any operator. With a negligence regime the question becomes whether the 
judge accurately sets the negligence standard – by way of considering all the risk information 
available. By involving expert witnesses in court procedures (eg agency personnel) this may 
effectively be the case. In the public sphere one can think of a system that works via the 
operation of licenses, for instance. Here, relevant is the authority carrying out regular check-
ups as to whether an operator’s facilities comply with the standards imposed by the safety 
regulation.  
 
As illustrated in section 3, it is possible to give operators some incentives to gather 
information on newly emerged risks (and thereby cause them to adapt their care and activity 
level) depending on the liability system. Hence, it is not exclusively possible to erode lack of 
knowledge on the side of the operators with a view to risks that form part of the state of the 
art via shifting to safety regulation but it is to a significant extent possible by certain designs 
of liability law. This can also be achieved by way of fine-tuning whether a state of the art 
defense exists and under which conditions, incentives for the operator to become informed 
can be generated. Leaving strict liability aside, the question boils down to whether the judge 
or the authority is in a better position to assess the liability standard (by having gotten hold of 
all new information). As said, one can think of experts appearing in court procedures, a 
scenario that may be anticipated by the operators when deciding on the care/activity level. 
Overall a central authority may be privileged in the sense that it can gather information in a 
low cost way. 
 
What about the case of a risk not yet known according to the state of the art? As illustrated in 
section 3 to advance the state of the art – and thus, innovation – incentives are again 
necessary and similarly operators need to be incentivised to do research with a view to 
identifying new risks. Obviously incentives to innovate are not only stimulated by the tort 
system but also crucially by patent law. Is a public authority again privileged? One would 
typically expect experts (operators) to be more easily able to identify potentially new and up 
to date unknown risks given their proximity with the production processes. Therefore, those 
incentives need to be set into motion. It is more unlikely that a public agency would research 
new risks – even though it might depend a bit on the personnel structure of the agency – but 
some studies could well be commissioned by a public authority. It is even more unheard of 
                                                          
42 See Shavell (fn 15) 270; C Hood/H Rothstein/R Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk 
Regulation Regimes (2001), 73. 
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that public authorities would be the ones to innovate with a view to new products. Complying 
with safety regulation shields operators from liability similar to operating at the optimal care 
level as induced by a negligence standard. Strict liability works differently. The public 
authority, hence, needs operators as an information source. Otherwise the safety regulation 
may be ill-suited. A differentiation may be warranted as to where information costs to the 
individual operator are high vs. low. In the latter case the operator can be entrusted to 
research, whereas in the case of ‘high information cost’ (compared to the private benefits) 
one may have to look for a more centralised solution. Of course, the challenge is to know 
which context will involve high or low information costs ex ante. 
 
The regulatory system has undoubtedly its own weaknesses as well. Information gathering 
and standard setting via regulation is relatively costly. Also regulation only works well when 
there is (public) enforcement which will equally be costly.  
 
 
B Searching for smart mixes 
 
The foregoing suggests that there is scope of complementarity for liability law and 
regulations generally and also more particularly in the context of ‘unknown risks’. Generally, 
arguing along the four steps that Shavell suggests, the following conclusions can be drawn: A 
public regulator generally profits from an information advantage. Specialised knowledge is 
necessary in the context of safety regulation, for its formulation and during compliance 
checks. At the same time, experts from the authorities may also be able to intervene in court 
proceedings, providing expert advice. One has to distinguish between different forms that 
information can have – as illustrated the crucial differentiation is whether information is out 
there according to the state of the art but not known to some operators or goes beyond the 
state of art. In the latter contingency the incentives of the operators are key. The liability 
systems generate important incentive effects. Incentives to innovate should likewise not be 
neglected. The negligence rule can, as said, generate public information about the state of the 
art. The negligence rule could possibly be fruitfully combined with regulatory oversight 
where the regulator collects and shares this information.  
 
The insolvency risk of the tortfeasor is also labelled the problem of the ‘judgment-proof 
wrongdoer’. As to insolvency, law and economics literature argues that private law 
generally provides only purely monetary sanctions that cannot sufficiently deter a judgment-
proof offender.43 This is generally true. However, a civil law injunction is different because 
the prospect thereof can be a powerful deterrent for an operator.44 With mass damage cases 
regarding previously ‘unknown risks’, like the BSE scandal, one can easily imagine how 
compensation claims would surmount a tortfeasor’s assets.45 Regarding insolvent 
wrongdoers, Shavell points us to regulatory enforcement because parties need to comply in 
                                                          
43 Shavell (fn 3) 473. An insolvent trader cannot be deterred by purely monetary sanctions. In practice, this is 
where insurances and funds come into play. In contract law, the judgment-proof problem is mitigated, according 
to Shavell (fn 3) 586, as people tend to know about each other. 
44 See MG Faure/AI Ogus/NJ Philipsen, Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics of Regulatory 
Enforcement (2009) 31 Law & Policy 161, 176; AI Ogus/LT Visscher, A Law and Economics Perspective on 
Injunctive Relief (2010) 17 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 32. 
45 The potential insolvency is obviously an important argument in favour of mandatory solvency guarantees, 
such as insurance. See in that respect inter alia P Jost, Limited liability and the requirement to purchase 
insurance (1996) 16 IRLE 259 and MG Faure, Economic Criteria for Compulsory Insurance (2006) 31 The 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 149. 
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order to be able to engage in a certain activity.46 This is certainly the case if a product’s 
access to the market is otherwise barred. The food sector, however, does for instance not 
fully work according to this principle. A responsibility is also placed on businesses to assess 
if their products are compliant for large parts of the food industry. This means that they 
may, however, also commit regulatory breaches and we would again need to look at the 
sanctioning mechanisms. Also administrative law makes use primarily of monetary 
sanctions, like fines. However, sanctions such as license revocation available to a public 
agency might be more effective with regard to a judgment-proof wrongdoer.47 Here, an 
important advantage lies with criminal law enforcement as the system has various available 
sanctions including non-monetary penalties, primarily imprisonment, that serve to remedy 
the issue of a judgment-proof defendant.48 Imprisonment is essential as a deterrent49 and is 
the desirable sanction when the probability of detection and conviction is low and the 
likelihood of defendants being judgment-proof is high.50 The danger of over-deterrence and 
operators withdrawing from a certain product market altogether has to be considered as well 
when imposing extensive liability for ‘unknown risks’ however. So, whereas public law 
enforcement scores better than private law enforcement regarding the judgment proof-
wrongdoer, it is really only criminal law that may provide for deterrence in all cases. 
 
There are some potential incentive problems regarding the rational expectation that a case 
will be initiated in the civil court and successfully litigated. The problem of rational apathy 
has been referred to. Additionally, one can mention the free-riding problem. We can imagine 
a situation in which many victims suffer from a law infringement but all gain as soon as one 
of them complains. For each individual it is beneficial to wait for someone else to institute a 
case and then profit from the result.51 Again a socially desirable action may not happen. We 
can see how this is clearly interrelated with the remedy sought. One can again think of 
designs of group litigation that reduce the free-riding mentality in terms of which strictly 
only those who contribute to the proceedings are allowed to profit from them.52 They might 
likewise help to reduce rational apathy. Public law enforcement may, likewise, be a cure to 
many of these problems. Deterrence and as a consequence an adjustment of the care and 
activity level and a decision on which information to research does obviously not work if 
liability cannot be expected. In such a situation it may be warranted for the public agency to 
ensure compliance with its safety regulation. The issue of incentives with a view to possible 
litigants are a problem in any enforcement context. With regards to damages due to 
‘unknown risks’ one can imagine both – scenarios with large, some as minor and widespread 
damage. The threat of a lawsuit might by purely relying on the liability system hence not 
always be imminent.  
 
The advantage of civil litigation is that (most of the) costs are only incurred whenever an 
actual case is litigated. A regulatory approach leads, on the other hand, to constant 
administrative costs. Identifying the costs in detail is challenging. These costs are particularly 
                                                          
46 See Shavell (1984) 13 JLS 357, 361. 
47 See Faure/Ogus/Philipsen (2009) 31 Law & Policy 161, 178 expand on the issue of licenses and how this can 
possibly have a greater deterrent effect for traders than imprisonment. 
48 See R Bowles/M Faure/N Garoupa, The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An Economic View 
and Policy Implications (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 389, 402; S Shavell, Criminal Law and the 
Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent (1985) 85 Col.L.Rev. 1232, 1247; Shavell (fn 3) 544. 
49 Shavell (fn 3) 532.  
50 See Bowles/Faure/Garoupa (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 389, 405.  
51 See Landes/Posner (1975) 4 JLS 1, 29. 
52 See RJ Van den Bergh, Private Enforcement of European Competition Law and the Persisting Collective 
Action Problem (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 12, 14. 
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high if a lot of responsibilities are placed on the public authority to carry out (ex ante) checks. 
They can be reduced if responsibility is placed upon the operators in the market. In this case, 
non-compliance with the regulation triggers an enforcement response just as liability rules 
do. Hence, again (to a large extent) costs in these scenarios only occur once there are reasons 
to expect non-compliance. With a view to newly discovered risks one can imagine how 
safety regulation is constantly being updated. With a view to the negligence standard, this 
new information would have to be incorporated via the court system.  
General liability for unknown risks avoids having to answer the question which risks the 
injurer could and should have known. It simplifies the procedure and therefore reduce 
administrative costs. The same holds for the fact that the information at the time of the 
trial is used, rather than information at the time of the act, which might be decades ago. It is 
therefore easier to set the behavioural standard. On the other hand, liability for unknown 
risks might result in more tort suits, because it is now also possible to hold someone liable 
for losses caused by risks which were not known at the time of the act. This results in 
higher administrative costs. The total effect cannot be predicted theoretically and depends 
on the size of both sub-effects. The more new risks that are discovered over time and the 
easier it is to assess the ex ante due care level, the more likely it is that liability for 
unknown risks results in increased administrative costs. 
 
The outcome provides a mixed pictures and leads to the conclusion that aiding the key public 
players by some supplementary private law enforcement may be warranted. The guideline 
with a view to the possible incentive effects of the liability system was developed in section 
3.  
 
 
C A Private Interest Approach 
 
Yet another argument can be advanced in favour of a ‘smart mix’ between tort law and 
regulation. So far we assumed that public regulation, as the name suggests, is made by public 
officials in the public interest. However, public choice theory has powerfully pointed at the 
fact that incentives of bureaucrats may be diluted as a result of capturing by interest groups. 
This danger may also play out when unknown risks could emerge, for example from GMOs, 
pharmaceutical products or geo-engineering. Successful lobbying and seeking by private 
interest groups may prevent regulators from undertaking precisely from the necessary 
research into the state of the art. There is, moreover, the risk of capture at the level of 
enforcement as well.53 As such, taking into account the predictions from public choice theory 
concerning the likely success of interest groups there is a large likelihood that special interest 
may prevail at the level of regulation. Olson predicted that special interest groups would be 
successful if the transaction cost for the group would be relatively low and if the information 
cost for the public would be high.54 Usually the groups (such as the pharmaceutical industry) 
concerned are well-organised and have relatively low transaction costs. The information cost 
for the public at large to discover that adequate research into unknown risk is not undertaken 
by the regulator because of lobbying by interest groups may be very high. Becker indicates 
that if a countervailing power (for example by non-governmental organisations or consumer 
groups representing the interest of potential victims) exists, there is a likelihood that 
competition between different interest groups will emerge, as a result of which the 
                                                          
53 See AI Ogus, Regulation: legal form and economic theory (1994) 57. For the food sector more specifically, 
see S Henson/J Caswell, Food safety regulation: an overview of contemporary issues (1999) 24 Food Policy 
589.  
54 M Olson, The logic of collective action (1965). 
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regulation may still come close to an efficient result.55 However, in the case of the activities 
which could involve unknown risks there is again a danger that this countervailing power is 
not present. As a result there is a serious danger that the public regulator may, as a result of 
the influence of private interest, not take sufficient efforts to invest in disclosing unknown 
risks. Again, various remedies may be applied to ensure that the interest of the regulator is 
better aligned with the public interest. Regulation to separate competences either by different 
entities or different units may be warranted,56 and the possibility of appeals and reviews (as 
generally provided for in administrative procedural law) may reduce the occurrence of this 
risk. Another measure is the case selection procedure and ways to challenge the refusal to 
investigate of the entity. Also for this reason a mix of regulation with supplementary private 
law enforcement may be warranted. The mix may serve as a disciplining mechanism, still 
exposing tortfeasors (especially under a strict liability regime) still to liability, even when 
regulation (as a result of the evolvement of private interest) would fail.  
 
Lastly, having in mind a resource-saving enforcement approach, making use of some self-
regulatory techniques may also be desirable. One of the presumed advantages of self-
regulation is that it generates better information (since operators – experts – would be better 
informed than bureaucrats).57 Thus such a system would, given the information advantage, be 
able to solve cases of non-compliance at lower costs than a court system or a system relying 
purely on public regulation. Moreover, such a system is often privately financed (by 
industry), which may have substantial advantages in providing incentives for cost 
reduction.58 Then again, the risk of capture is embedded in self-regulation. According to 
some authors, self-regulation runs the risk of being the ‘ultimate form’ of regulatory capture, 
as there is obviously a tight link to the industry.59 It may be crucial for governments to play 
an ‘active role’ in monitoring self-regulatory activities.60 Self-regulatory entities enforcing 
codes of conducts are also typically much more limited in their sanctioning powers. Again an 
interlinkage with other, more powerful, enforcers is crucial to incentivise compliance with 
self-regulatory schemes. Such schemes will not work with businesses operating in the food 
market that do not care about their reputation as they exert very limited binding power. 
 
 
V Insurance for unknown risk 
 
The concept of insurance for unknown risks sounds a bit like a paradox. One of the key 
                                                          
55 GS Becker, A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence (1983) 89 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 371. 
56 See F Cafaggi/H-W Micklitz, Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection: The Way 
Forward, in: F Cafaggi/H-W Micklitz (eds), New Frontiers of Consumer Protection – The Interplay Between 
Private and Public Enforcement (2009), 406: ‘In theory the use of public agencies to monitor and directly 
sanction would seem to be more effective than separating administrative monitoring from judicial enforcement. 
But especially in relation to cooperative enforcement, when the enforcer has to conclude agreements with the 
infringer, the resort to an independent judiciary may ensure transparency and reduce capture. Thus the higher the 
use of cooperative enforcement, the more necessary it is to resort to separation between monitoring and 
enforcement.’ 
57 See on the advantages of self-regulation inter alia AI Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation (1995) 15 Oxford JLS 
97.  
58On the other hand, the payment structure can make a case for introducing regulation against biased decision-
making. 
59 See FH Stephen/JH Love, Regulation of the Legal Profession, in: B Bouckaert/G De Geest (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume III: The Regulation of Contracts (2000) 990. 
60 See JC Miller III, The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of Self-Regulation (1985) 
4 Cato Journal 897, 903. 
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features of insurance, as has often been held in the literature, is that insurers make 
calculations of the probability that a certain event may occur, either based on statistics 
(which are in turn based on past loss experience) or based on modelling (predicting the 
occurrence of the risk in the future). However, the basis for any type of insurance is that 
a risk has to some extent to be predictable in order to be insurable. Factual and legal 
uncertainty are considered factors that endanger this insurability. When risks would 
indeed be totally unknown, predictability and hence insurability would be problematic.61 
However, it is paradoxical that in practice insurers may cover (even unknowingly) 
unknown risk, for example when they provide a general liability cover to enterprises. 
Moreover, it can be held that exactly where risks are unknown the risk aversion of 
operators may be high and hence also the demand for protection via insurance. That 
hence raises the question whether there are ways of dealing with unknown risk from an 
insurability perspective. We will first address predictability as a general condition for 
insurability, but also point to the concept of ‘ambiguity aversion’ by insurers and 
techniques that have been used to reduce this aversion (A). Next, the question will be 
addressed whether particular solutions could be envisaged to deal with the unknown 
character of particular risks (B). The question for example arises whether the unknown 
character of a risk should be considered more problematic in the context of a third party 
(liability) insurance or in the context of a first party insurance. Moreover, in the literature it 
has been suggested that risk-sharing between operators might be preferable in situations of 
uncertainty since risk-sharing is possible without an assignment of probabilities. Finally the 
question arises how the potential liability of operators for unknown risks should be viewed 
from an insurability perspective (C). This question has been addressed under the heading 
of ‘retrospective liability’, whereby operators would be held liable for risks which they 
could not foresee ex ante. There is hence a clear parallel with the liability for unknown 
risks discussed in the previous section. Such a retrospective liability is, so we will argue, 
often problematic from an insurance perspective. 
 
 
A Predictability 
 
1) General 
 
The essence of an insurance scheme is that the insurer will, based on ex ante information 
concerning a particular risk, engage in risk assessment and on that basis calculate the 
objective value of the risk leading to a so-called actuarial fair premium. It may be clear that in 
that respect unknown risks constitute a serious problem.62 A crucial element in insurance in 
order to make an accurate premium calculation possible is to have precise information on the 
probability that a certain loss will occur and the insurer should have a more or less accurate 
estimate of the potential magnitude of the damage. The predictability, necessary to calculate 
the premiums (and to set aside a reserve necessary to have money available when the risk 
materializes) is usually based on the past loss history of a particular risk and thus on statistics. 
Statistics may, precisely given the unknown character of the risk, be lacking. But the same 
problem may arise with respect to the second possibility to calculate premiums, namely, to 
engage in a risk assessment on the basis of modelling. If the risk would be entirely unknown, 
such a modelling would obviously be impossible as well. However, it may be clear that this 
representation is is a too black and white presentation. After all, if risks were unknown ex 
                                                          
61 This regards the difference between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ we referred to in footnote 1. 
62 Also see Fondazione Roselli (fn 32), 69ff. 
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ante there would equally be no demand for insurance. After allAnd, why would an insured 
demand cover for particular risks that cannot be known yet? The answers lies to some extent 
in the fact that often, especially under liability insurance, insurers may provide rather general 
coverage, for example, eg for operational risks of all different kinds and may hence not be 
aware of unknown risks that would be related to a particular insured. 
 
2) Insurer Ambiguity 
 
It has been indicated in the literature that the mere fact that there is uncertainty concerning 
particular risks, for example resulting from the absence of reliable statistics, should not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that a particular risk is uninsurable. This uncertainty is 
referred to as ‘insurer ambiguity’.63 It is held that the insurer can react to this ambiguity 
concerning either the probability of the event or the magnitude of the damage by charging a 
so-called risk premium to account for a particular unpredictability. In practice insurers could 
hence, when they fear that in a general (for example liability) cover some unknown risks 
would be involved, try to some extent deal with that risk by charging an additional risk 
premium. The extent to which insurers are able to actually charge this additional premium of 
course also depends upon the comparative environment in which the insurer finds himself. 
 
However, there may be other solutions or remedies enabling insurers to deal with unknown 
risks.  
 
 
B Potential solutions 
 
1) First party versus third party insurance 
 
Generally a distinction is made between two types of insurance: liability insurance is a third 
party insurance whereby the insurer covers the risk that the insured (the potentially 
responsible operator) would have to provide compensation to a third party. First party 
insurance to the contrary is a system whereby the insurance coverage is provided and 
compensation is awarded directly to the victim. The underlying principle in first party 
insurance is that the insurance undertaking in principle pays as soon as the damage occurs, 
provided that it can be proven that the particular damage has been caused by the insured risk. 
Payment by the insurance undertaking therefore occurs irrespective of whether there is 
liability. The literature has strongly argued in favour of first party insurance, arguing that it 
would lead to lower transaction costs and that it would make risk differentiation substantially 
easier.64 The reason is that with first party insurance the insurer directly covers the risk of 
damage to a particular victim or to a particular site. This may hence be less vulnerable to the 
emergence of new risks. Liability insurance involves many more uncertainties, for example 
related to how the judge will interpret the specific liability of the insured operator. In an ideal 
world under first party insurance risk differentiation would also be easier as it allows the 
insurer to directly monitor the behaviour of the insured risk, namely, the insured victim.65 
Although obviously unknown risks may equally pose a problem for first party insurance one 
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could generally hold that greater use of first party insurances would probably lead to less 
problems than the use of third party liability insurance when unknown risks are involved. 
 
 
2) Risk-sharing agreements 
 
An alternative to insurance is a risk-sharing (also referred to as risk distribution or risk 
pooling) between plant operators. It consists of an agreement whereby operators ex ante agree 
to mutually share each other’s losses. Skogh has indicated in several publications that risk 
pooling has a few advantages compared to insurance, especially in case of uncertainty (as with 
unknown risks). Risk-sharing between operators does not necessarily require the ex ante 
payment of a premium. Mutual risk-sharing can be based on an agreement to share losses ex 
post but does not require actuarial information on the risk ex ante.66 It is only necessary that 
the relative contribution to the risk of the various operators is known, so that they can agree on 
their mutual share. Given the unknown character of the risk, risk distribution could even be 
based on a proportional share, eg related to the size of the operator involved. Mutual risk-
sharing could therefore be an option if unknown risks are involved and hence precise actuarial 
information on the predictability of the risk is lacking.  
 
It is therefore no surprise that especially in areas of catastrophic risks, such as marine 
pollution or nuclear risks, risk pooling between operators is used to a large extent. Risk-
sharing between operators is also advocated for new technologies that could involve 
unknown risks, such as for the case of carbon capture and storage.67 Risk-sharing between 
operators could hence provide an interesting alternative for particular activities where 
unknown risks may be involved. However, one should realise that risk-sharing equally entails 
particular administrative costs and that it usually emerges between operators that have 
comparable risk profiles as a result of which administrative costs can be kept relatively low. 
Risk-sharing agreements may hence not be a viable alternative for all situations where 
unknown risks would emerge. 
 
 
C Retrospective liability 
 
One issue for against which the literature has warned is for a so-called retrospective liability. 
It does not so much concern liability for unknown risks, but rather the situation where there 
was initially no liability for particular risks but because of due to a change in the scope of 
liability rules, liability is ex post expanded ex post to a domain for which the insured is still 
held liable. Obviously there is a thin line between the liability for unknown risk on the one 
hand and the situation where a care or liability standard changes and as a result liability is 
created. In fact there have been many situations examples of this in various legal systems, for 
example, concerning asbestos or the drug DES where it was held that it was not foreseeable 
for operators , nor for their insurers that these type of activities would give rise to liability.68 
It can certainly be held that such a retrospective liability, ie where only after the fact, ex post 
                                                          
66 See G Skogh, Development risks, strict liability and the insurability of industrial hazards (1998) 23 Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance 247; G Skogh, Insurance Coverage of Accidental Damage, in: H-B Schäfer et al 
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67 See for details M Faure, Liability and compensation for damage resulting from CO2 storage sites (2016) 40 
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 454. 
68 Whether these statements are absolutely correct is of course another issue.  
20  
liability is created is problematic from an insurance perspective.69 The problem is that if 
insurers are held liable ex post for risks which could not be foreseen ex ante when the 
insurance contract was concluded, no additional premium has been charged for the particular 
risk, that no preventive measures could be demanded and that also no reserves have been set 
aside. IAgain, it is one issue to generally provide general liability cover and another to , also 
cover for risks that are technically still unknown. In the latter case liability insurers may be 
aware of the fact that they partially provide cover for as yet unknown risks related to the 
activity of the operator and they could, given this situation of insurer ambiguity, charge an 
additional risk premium. The situation envisaged here is that it would not be foreseeable at all 
for an insurer that a particular risk would give rise to liability and that it is not a new risk 
which appears in the future, but rather a change of the legal rule or liability standard which 
leads to the duty on the operator and hence on the insurer to compensate of the operator and 
hence of the insurer. The latter situation, often referred to as retrospective liability, is 
undesirable since it could indeed amount to an insurability.70 
 
 
VI Concluding remarks 
 
We started by explaining that from the Law and Economics perspective that we presented in 
this contribution, liability for unknown risks may be problematic. The simple reason is that a 
starting point of the economic analysis of accident law is that operators are exposed to 
liability risks which will hence provide them incentives for taking optimal care and for 
adopting optimal activity levels. If it is assumed that these risks are unknown to the operator 
it will obviously become impossible to have those incentive effects directly related to care 
and activity levels. However, the crucial question is whether a liability for unknown risks can 
induce a potential tortfeasor to do more research in order to find out more about the risks 
which could be related to his activity. In that respect we argued that a strict liability rule may 
have the major advantage that it shifts the entire accidents costs (both the costs of prevention 
as well as the expected damage) to the injurer. As a result of that the potential injurer will 
engage in an optimal weighing of the marginal costs of investing more in versus the marginal 
benefits in obtaining more information about the risks. We argued that the situation with 
negligence is slightly more complicated, depending upon the precise interpretation of the 
standard of care under the applicable negligence rule. If negligence would imply that an 
operator would not be held liable since he took the optimal care level on the basis of the 
information he possessed the problem may be that this may does not provide sufficient 
incentives for investing in optimal research to find information about those unknown risks. It 
is therefore clear that care standards, also under negligence, have to be interpreted in a 
dynamic manner in order to be adapted to increasing insights that render previously unknown 
risks known. However, a problem is that care standards under negligence are set by the court, 
which may by definition have less information on risks than the operator. That is an 
important argument in favour of primarily using ex ante safety regulation to discover 
unknown risks. Regulators may have better information than judges (if a negligence standard 
is applied in tort law) but in some cases also than operators (under strict liability). Regulation 
moreover has the advantage that it can use economies of scale and pass on information on 
new risks via safety regulation. However, safety regulation has important limits as well. One 
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important limit being that regulation is not only created in the public interest, but in particular 
cases in the private interest. The intervention of private interest may lead to reduced 
incentives of agencies to acquire information about unknown risks. That is one important 
reason (in addition to other limitations inherent in the public safety standard setting) in favour 
of a search for so-called ‘smart mixes’, implying that safety regulation should be combined 
with liability rules. More particularly since the negligence standard is dependent upon the 
definition of an ex ante determined standard of care safety regulation could fulfill that task.  
 
Finally we indicated that unknown risks may also constitute a serious problem for insurers. 
Unknown risks do not make risks necessarily uninsurable as long as insurers are aware of the 
fact that they may be covering risks that are not known yet. Theoretically first party insurance 
would be better able to deal with those uncertainties than third party liability insurance. 
However, it is possible that equally in a third party liability setting insurers have provided 
broad general liability cover as a result of which future unknown risks may automatically be 
included. That is not necessarily a problem as long as the insurer can incorporate this 
unknown risk by, for example, charging an additional risk premium in order to deal with the 
ambiguity aversion of the insurer. Also, in particular cases risk-sharing agreements may be 
more practicable than insurance since risk-sharing has the major advantage that it does not 
need the ex ante precise assignment of probabilities with respect to risk. However, although 
risk-sharing agreements are gaining increasing popularity, they may not be feasible for all 
types of risks. We concluded by formulating a particular warning for the case where liability 
is not related to unknown risks, but where it is rather the liability risk that was unknown ex 
ante, a situation referred to as retrospective liability. It is for this particular case that we 
argued that uninsurability might arise as a result of which we held that the policy maker 
should avoid this to in as far as possible.  
 
